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Complex Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties 
 
Abstract: The existence of complex predicates seems to support an abundant 
conception of properties. Specifically, the application conditions for complex 
predicates seem to be explained by the distribution of a sparser base of 
predicates. This explanatory link might suggest that the existence and 
distribution of properties expressed by complex predicates are explained by the 
existence and distribution of a sparser base of properties. Thus, complex 
predicates seem to legitimize the assumption of a wide array of properties. The 
additional properties are no explanatory addition to the sparse base. I argue, 
however, that construing complex predicates as expressing properties 
undermines the explanatory links between simple and complex predications. 
The argument explores a variety of accounts of complex predicates currently on 
offer and develops a number of themes from the work of Herbert Hochberg. 
 
 According to an influential tradition, a predicate of one’s preferred theory 
ought to correspond to something in the world, a feature shared by the various 
entities that satisfy the predicate.1 If the predicate ‘is a kangaroo’ occurs in one’s 
preferred theory, then one ought to posit a property which all of the various 
things that satisfy ‘is a kangaroo’ have in common.2 
 
Philosophers of this persuasion divide into two camps. Some endorse 
sparse conceptions of properties on which some collections of entities lack a 
common property. These philosophers hesitate to deploy additional predicates 
in their preferred description of the world. The predicates of day-to-day 
language and the special sciences likely do not correspond to properties. These 
predicates must ultimately give way to the predicates of a more austere schema. 
Other property theorists endorse abundant conceptions: every arbitrary 
grouping of individuals shares some property. Therefore, a theory would be no 
worse for having a predicate corresponding to any such grouping.  
  
 The existence of complex predicates seems to support an abundant 
conception of properties. Complex predicates are formed by coordinating 
predicates using operators such as ‘and’ and ‘or’. For example, one may shorten 
sentences (1) and (2) to (1*) and (2*), respectively. 
 
(1) Joe is young and Joe is a kangaroo. 
(1*) Joe is young and is a kangaroo. 
                                                        
1 Bergmann (1952: 430) says, “Who admits a single primitive predicate admits 
properties among the building stones of his world.” 
2 This does not entail that properties are in any way linguistic or language 
dependent. Rather, according to this framework, one should formulate one’s 
preferred theory so as to reflect which properties one takes to be in the world. 
Thus, a philosopher who genuinely believes that there is a property of being a 
kangaroo should see fit to include the predicate ‘is a kangaroo’ in her preferred 
theory.  Nor does this view require one to endorse a deviant (non-Quinean) 
criterion of ontological commitment. What is required is the presupposition that 
in a perspicuous theory, predicates correspond to all and only the properties. 
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(2) Joe is young or Joe is a kangaroo. 
(2*) Joe is young or is a kangaroo. 
 
(1) and (2) are composed of sub-sentences connected by the sentential operators 
‘and’ and  ‘or’, respectively. (1*) and (2*) are predications in which ‘and’ and ‘or’, 
respectively, connect simpler predicates to form more complex ones. Thus, (1*) 
contains the complex predicate ‘is young and is a kangaroo’ and (2*) contains the 
complex predicate ‘is young or is a kangaroo’.  
 
Additional complex predicates can be formed using the expression ‘such 
that’. Thus, a relational statement such as (3) may be contracted into a 
predication such as (3*). 
 
(3) Joe saw Joe. 
(3*) Joe is such that he saw himself. 
 
More generally, one can transform any sentence in which ‘Joe’ figures in 
transparent position into a predication on Joe using ‘such that’. In this way, a 
sparse base of predicates can generate a wide array of complex predicates.  
 
Moreover, the application conditions for complex predicates seem to be 
explained by the distribution of a sparser base of predicates. This position 
purports to legitimize abundant theories of properties, since they are seen as 
raising no new explanatory requirements. It has even been held that the facts 
about the complex predicate logically follow from facts about the components.3  
 
I will investigate this explanatory claim: that the distribution of properties 
expressed by complex predicates is explained by the distribution of properties 
expressed by the predicates that figure in them. Put differently, I ask whether the 
ingredients that go into the content of a complex statement—a conjunction such 
as (1) or a disjunction such as (2)—suffice to explain what is required in the 
world for a corresponding complex predication to be true. The statements (1) 
and (2) surely require something of the world. Do (1*) and (2*)—construed as 
ascriptions of properties—require anything more? I will argue that they do, and 
that these additional requirements stand in need of explanation. This paper 
therefore aims to illuminate how complexity in language relates to complexity in 
the world. 
 
In §1, I explore purported applications of construing complex predicates 
as expressing properties. In §2, I set aside currently fashionable explanatory 
strategies that appeal to grounding. In §§3-7, I explore various accounts of 
complex predicates, arguing that these are insufficient to deliver the explanatory 
benefits without a background property theory. In §8, I discuss approaches to 
complex predicates that do not posit complex properties. The arguments explore 
some interconnected themes developed by Herbert Hochberg over his long 
career. 
 
                                                        
3 Salmon (2010: 451). 
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1. The Applications of Complex Predicates 
 
 Complex predicates have been held to play a variety of roles.  I focus on 
their roles in logic and in developing a notion of reduction as property 
identification. These purported applications illustrate why the distribution of 
properties expressed by complex predicates must be explained by the 
distribution of properties expressed by the simpler predicates composing them. I 
express these explanatory demands using the following schema. 
 
Explanation: The truth of a explains the truth of the claim a is  
an x such that x.4 
Logicality: a is equivalent to the claim a is an x such that x 
by logic plus the semantic account of complex 
predication. No appeal needs to be made to a 
background property theory. 
 
The latter constraint is stronger than the former. If there is a sense in which 
complex predications are logically entailed by the distribution of the predicates 
that they contain, then their behavior can be explained in terms of that of their 
constituents predicates.  
 
A reason for rejecting these explanatory claims will correspondingly 
provide a reason for rejecting these applications of complex predication. My aim 
in the paper is to show that if we construe complex predications as genuine 
property ascriptions, then the explanatory claims are unsupportable. 
 
1.1 Quantification and Identity 
 
Complex predicates figure centrally in a dominant understanding of the 
development of the logic of quantification and identity. According to this story, 
Frege and Russell showed that the quantifiers ‘something’ and ‘everything’ are 
higher-level predicates that take first-level predicates as arguments.5 A sentence 
such as ‘something is a kangaroo’ attributes the 2nd-level property of being 
instantiated to the property expressed by ‘is a kangaroo’, just as ‘Joe is a 
kangaroo’ attributes the 1st-level property of being a kangaroo to Joe.  
 
This story is apocryphal. Nonetheless, there is a grain of truth to it since 
both Frege and Russell spoke of quantifiers as combining with expressions 
similar in role to complex predicates. Consider Russell’s (1905, 480) 
characterization of sentences of the form ‘everything is C’ and ‘something is C’—
written C(everything) and C(something), respectively—in terms of 
propositional functions: 
 
(A) C(everything) means C(x) is always true  
(B) C(something) means C(x) is sometimes true.  
                                                        
4 I use bold text instead of corner quotes. 
5 This story figures in Cresswell (1973: 6), Sainsbury (1979: 10-11), Dummett 
(1982: chapter 2), and Soames (2010: 119-129).  
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In these formulations, C(x) expresses a propositional function, which—very 
roughly—is the worldly correlate of a complex predicate in Russell’s early 
ontology.  
 
In an account of this sort, complex predicates are required to analyze 
generalities such as (4) and (5). 
 
(4) Something is such that it is young and it is a kangaroo. 
(5) Everything is such that if it is a kangaroo, then it is young. 
 
In order to treat the quantifiers ‘something’ and ‘everything’ as predicates of 
predicates, they must operate on predicates in (4) and (5). Using italics to 
represent a propositional function, one may regiment these as (4*) and (5*):  
 
(4*) x is a young and x is a kangaroo is sometimes true. 
(5*) if x is a young, then x is a kangaroo is always true. 
 
(4*) may be read as: the propositional function, x is young and x is a kangaroo, is 
sometimes true. (5*) may be read as: the propositional function, x such that if x is 
young, then x is a kangaroo, is always true. Thus, complex predicates—under the 
guise of propositional functions—are required to analyze even very simple 
quantified sentences on this account.6 
 
To streamline presentation, I use the notation of the -calculus. A complex 
predicate of the form is an x such that 𝝓(𝒙) will be regimented using the -
abstract x𝝓(𝒙).7 The view that quantifiers operate on complex predicates can 
then be expressed by treating the quantifiers ‘’ and ‘’ as operating on -
abstracts such as 𝝀𝒙𝝓(𝒙). Thus, sentences of the form everything is such that it 
is 𝝓 will be represented as ∀𝝀𝒙𝝓(𝒙), while sentences of the form something is 
such that it is 𝝓 will be represented as ∃𝝀𝒙𝝓(𝒙). 
 
 Quantification and identity are intimately related. So it is natural that 
complex predicates are attractive to those theorizing about identity. Specifically, 
one of the defining characteristics of identity is Leibniz’s Law: if a and b are 
identical, then what holds of a also holds of b. A traditional way of regimenting 
this idea allows for universal substitution of ‘a’ for ‘b’.  
 
Leibniz’s Law 1 [LL1]: a=b 
      𝜙     
    𝜙[𝑎/𝑏] 
                                                        
6 For related reasons, Russell (1918: 237) worries that positing general facts will 
force him to reintroduce worldly correlates of truth functional connectives such 
as ‘and’ and ‘or’ into his ontology. 
7 This calls for two comments. First, I am not yet imposing any interpretation on 
-abstracts beyond their role in regimenting English expressions. Second, -
abstracts can occur in predicate position, but I remain neutral as to whether they 
can also occur in subject position. 
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This understanding of Leibniz’s Law works most cleanly in extensional contexts. 
For instance, it allows one to infer ‘Phosphorous is bright’ from ‘Hesperus is 
bright’ and ‘Hesperus = Phosphorous’.  
 
However, this regimentation faces difficulties if we admit intensional 
contexts such as modal or epistemic operators.8 Thus, many would resist the 
inference from the premises ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ and ‘the Babylonians 
believed that Hesperus was bright’ to the claim ‘the Babylonians believed that 
Phosphorus was bright’. This might lead one to adopt another form of Leibniz’s 
Law according to which anything truly predicated of a is also truly predicated of 
anything identical to a. 
 
 
 Leibniz’s Law 2 [LL2]: a=b 
      𝜆𝑥𝜙𝑥(𝑎)     
      𝜆𝑥𝜙𝑥(𝑏) 
 
This line of reasoning allows one to resist the above inference, if one denies that 
‘the Babylonians believed that Hesperus was bright’ entails ‘x(the Babylonians 
believed that x was bright)(Hesperus)’, which says that Hesperus is such that the 
Babylonians believed that it was bright. 
 
One important consequence of this conceptualization of quantification 
and Leibniz’s Law is that one cannot directly apply a rule of universal 
instantiation or Leibniz’s Law 1 in arbitrary formulas. This can be illustrated in 
the case of quantification by considering the inference from (6) to (7).  
 
(6) Everything is such that it is young and it a kangaroo. 
(7) Joe is young and Joe a kangaroo. 
 
On the view under consideration, one cannot directly infer (7) from (6). Rather, 
the inference must proceed via the intermediate step (7*). 
 
(6) Everything is such that it is young and it a kangaroo. 
(7*) x(x is young and x is a kangaroo)(Joe)  -Instantiation 
(7) Joe is young and a kangaroo.   Conversion  
 
Thus, the logicality of the inference from (6) to (7) depends on the logicality of 
the “conversion” from (7*) to (7). Analogous results hold for applications of 
Leibniz’s Law. 
 
So in order for the standard inferences to count as logical on this 
construal, the link between a basic sentence and the predication of the 
corresponding -abstract must be logical. At very least, this serves to highlight 
that there must be some intimate link between a statement in which a name 
occurs (a) and a corresponding complex predication x(x)(a). 
                                                        
8 See discussion in Stalnaker (1977). 
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1.2 Property Reductions  
 
It has been argued that the properties expressed by complex predicates 
play a role in inter-theoretic reduction. This purported application provides 
another illustration of the requisite explanatory connection between a complex 
predicate and its component expressions. Imagine that a traveller in Australia 
learns the predicate ‘is a joey’ by immersion. The traveller will eventually come 
to accept (8). 
 
(8) For any x, x is a joey iff x is young and x is a kangaroo. 
 
If one takes the predicates in this sentence to express properties, then (8) is 
striking. For, it surely demands explanation that the property expressed by ‘is a 
joey’ is always coincident with the pair of properties expressed by ‘is young’ and 
‘is a kangaroo’. 
 
 The predicate ‘is a joey’ is a toy example. But there are serious issues at 
stake. The predicates of the special sciences—chemistry, biology, psychology, 
and so on—are sometimes coincident with open sentences of the languages of 
physics. Such coincidence demands explanation. One of the aims of science is to 
provide such explanations. 
 
Kim and others argued that these explanations issue from the fact that 
special sciences can be deduced from the facts stated by the underlying science 
together with statements identifying the properties of the special sciences with 
properties of the underlying science.9 On this proposal, one first constructs a 
complex predicate from the open sentence, ‘x(x is young and x is a kangaroo)’. 
One then identifies the property expressed by a target special science predicate 
with the property expressed by the complex predicate. This is meant to provide 
an explanation, since—as Kim (2000, 98) remarks -- “Identity takes away the 
logical space in which explanatory questions can be formulated.” The property of 
being a joey and the property of being young and a kangaroo are “coinstantiated 
because they are in fact one and the same property”. 
 
Whether or not identities are so explanatory, they are insufficient on their 
own to explain a truth such as (8). Sentence (8) follows by logic from the 
relevant property identity only if it is a matter of logic that anything satisfying 
x(x is young and x is a kangaroo) also satisfies the open sentence x is young 
and x is a kangaroo. Hochberg (1978: 137) has remarked that even if one takes 
a sentence such as (8) as an analysis of ‘is a joey’, this does not answer “the 
question of whether there is an additional property or whether the property 
[being a joey] is ‘reduced’ to [being young] and [being a kangaroo]”. As Kim (103-
4) seemingly acknowledges, to fully explain (8), the link between a complex 
predication such as  ‘Joe is young and a kangaroo’ and corresponding complex 
sentence such as ‘Joe is young and Joe is a kangaroo’ must also take away the 
logical space in which explanatory questions can be formulated.  
                                                        
9 See Armstrong (1978: chapters 13 and 14) and Causey (1988). 
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2. Grounding  
 
A popular recent strategy for dealing with explanatory demands appeals 
to grounding. Proponents of this strategy attempt to satisfy the demand to 
explain one phenomenon in terms of another by suggesting that the former are 
grounded in the latter. It is often held that if A-facts are grounded in B-facts, then 
there is an explanation of A-facts by B-facts. Thus, one might hold that if facts 
reported by complex predications are grounded in facts reported by atomic 
predications, then there is an explanation of the former by the latter. 
 
I will not address this strategy in detail, but note only that it bifurcates.  
Some proponents of grounding, the modest ones, appeal to it only as a 
placeholder. The grounding claim reports that some strategy for metaphysical 
explanation of A-facts by B-facts is available.10 A grounding claim acts as a 
promissory note for a forthcoming explanation. One might hope that a 
satisfactory account of complex predicates would figure in this promised 
explanation. This paper aims to dash that hope. 
 
Other grounding theorists, the ambitious ones, argue that a grounding 
claim is an explanation.11 If the A-facts ground the B-facts, then the A-facts 
explain the B-facts. Nothing further is required. These grounding theorists would 
see the task of explaining complex properties as an instance of a broader task in 
metaphysical explanation. Thus, on this view, the equivalence between ‘Joe is 
young and a kangaroo’ and ‘Joe is young and Joe is a kangaroo’ is not ultimately 
explained by any facts peculiar to complex predication, but in terms of a 
primitive notion of grounding. For this reason, I put these more ambitious 
strategies aside. 
 
3. Set-Theoretic and Second-Order Approaches 
 
 The simplest models for complex predicates are set-theoretic. Stalnaker 
(1977: 328-9) models x as designating the set of objects satisfying . 
Similarly, Lewis (1986) argues that complex predicates are better explained 
using class-theoretic resources than a theory of universals.  
 
This is all fine as model-theory. But it is difficult to accept as metaphysics. 
There are familiar difficulties with class-nominalism such as those arising from 
the possibility of co-instantiated (or even necessarily co-instantiated) properties.   
 
More importantly, construing properties as classes does not in itself 
explain the distribution of properties expressed by complex predicates in terms 
of the distribution of properties expressed by simpler predicates. In other words, 
it does not show that the resources used to explain the simple predications 
                                                        
10 Wilson (unpublished) and Jenkins (2011) are at least open to the possibility 
that grounding or dependence claims may issue from underlying explanatory 
connections such as identity. See also MacBride (2013: §§3.6, 3.7). 
11 Perhaps, Fine (2001). 
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suffice for the complex ones. The existence of, say, the intersection of two sets 
does not follow from the existence of the sets, except by supposing a background 
theory of classes. Thus, holding that the conjunction of two predicates expresses 
the intersection of the classes expressed by the predicates requires a background 
property theory in the form of a theory of classes. 
 
 Moreover, classes seem inapt to play the roles described above for the 
properties expressed by complex predicates. For instance, if one wants to model 
the claim that something is self-identical as the claim that the property of being 
self-identical is instantiated, then one must hold that there is a property of being 
self-identical. If the property of being self-identical is the set of self-identical 
things, then there is a universal class.  This is problematic. 
 
It might be tempting to take complex predicates as disguised second-
order descriptions of properties. The most simple-minded approach would take 
a complex predicate such as ‘is young and a kangaroo’ [‘x(Yx&Kx)’] as a definite 
description of the unique property f possessed by anything that is young and is a 
kangaroo, so that 𝛷(𝜆𝑥(𝑌𝑥&𝐾𝑥)) =𝑑𝑒𝑓 (∃! 𝑓)((𝑓𝑥 ≡ (𝑌𝑥&𝐾𝑥))&𝛷(𝑓)). 
Hochberg (1977: 193) shows why this simple-minded approach is 
unsatisfactory. Namely, the schema “implies that there is one and only one 
property such that it is had by those things and only those things” that are young 
and a kangaroo. But on the assumption that we are dealing with properties and 
not classes, we want to leave open that the possibility that there are many 
properties had by all and only those things that are both young and a kangaroo. 
 
To leave room for the possibility that there are co-extensive properties 
possessed by anything that satisfies some given complex predicate, complex 
predicates must be disguised indefinite and not definite descriptions. 
 
𝛷(𝜆𝑥(𝑌𝑥&𝐾𝑥)) =𝑑𝑒𝑓 (∃𝑓)((𝑓𝑥 ≡ (𝑌𝑥&𝐾𝑥))&𝛷(𝑓)). 
 
There is nothing intrinsically objectionable about such an account, as there is 
with construing complex predicates as disguised definite descriptions. But such 
an account sits ill with the explanatory project. Rather than explaining the 
distribution of properties specified in terms of complex predicates in terms the 
distribution of simpler properties, it simply presupposes a background property 
theory. As Hochberg (2011: 69) remarks, “To specify something as the same as 
something else without saying what that something else is or knowing what it is 
on other grounds—by acquaintance, say—is problematic”. It is especially 
problematic if the specification is meant to meet explanatory demands. 
 
4. Primitive Complex Predications  
 
 I noted two ways to form a complex predicate. One way appeals to 
combinatory operators such as ‘and’, ‘or’, and ‘not’. These combine with 
predicates to form new predicates. ‘Not’ takes a predicate such as ‘is young’ as an 
argument and yields its negation, ‘is not young’. Similarly, ‘and’ and ‘or’ take two 
predicates such as ‘is young’ and ‘is a kangaroo’ and yield a conjunction and 
disjunction of these predicates, respectively: ‘is young and is a kangaroo’ and ‘is 
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young or is a kangaroo’. Sentences predicating these negative, conjunctive, and 
disjunctive predicates are not themselves negative, conjunctive, or disjunctive. 
They are simply predications. 
 
 The other way to form a predicate appeals to abstraction; complex 
predicates are the result of attaching the expression ‘is such that’ to an open 
sentence. This approach is embodied in the -calculus notation that I made use 
of above, as well as Russell’s circumflex notation. 
 
 Given that each approach corresponds to a well worked out mathematical 
theory, it might be tempting to rest content with one or the other methods for 
forming complex predicates as primitive.  I will argue, however, that this sort of 
primitivism does not secure the desired explanations of claims involving 
complex predications in terms of more basic predations. 
 
4.1 Primitive Combinators 
 
 A proponent of the combinator approach must explain the relationship 
between the predicate-forming combinators ‘not’, ‘and’, and ‘or’ and the more 
familiar sentence-forming operators with the same spelling and pronunciation. 
As Partee and Rooth (2002: 336) say, it is “no accident” that these are the same 
words.12  
 
The underlying reason for this is that sentences containing corresponding 
sentential and predicate conjunction seem logically equivalent. Thus, (2) ‘Joe is 
young or Joe is a kangaroo’ seems to entail (2*) ‘Joe is young or is a kangaroo’. 
Hochberg (1978, 253) remarks,  
 
[T]o have “complex predicates” we require additional “logical” signs to 
form any such predicates. We would, thus, require the construction of a 
calculus for properties that would [...] specify the connection between ‘∨ ′ 
as the standard sign for disjunction and, say, ‘v’ as used to form predicates. 
Thus, we would need to provide a basis for sentences like  
 
 (𝑥)[(𝐹1𝑥 ∨ 𝐹2𝑥) ≡ 𝐹1
∨𝐹2(𝑥)] 
 
 […] In short, we would have to construct a “logic” of properties. 
 
On this approach, the signs for predicate forming operators would need to be 
differentiated from the signs for sentence forming operators and the entailment 
between them would have to be explained. But if such predicate forming 
operators are primitive, then it is difficult to see what an explanation could 
consist in. We have instead a brute assertion of the equivalences such as 
(𝑥)[(𝐹1𝑥 ∨ 𝐹2𝑥) ≡ 𝐹1
∨𝐹2(𝑥)]. 
 
The task becomes even more difficult if one views predicates as standing 
for properties. As Hochberg (2003: 74) says: “Suppose one takes the pair of 
                                                        
12 Evans (1985c) calls it “absurd” to suppose that ‘and’ is ambiguous. 
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predicates ‘is ’ and ‘is not-’ to indicate two properties […] that are the 
‘negations’ of each other. If one then distinguishes ‘it is not the case that x is ’ 
and ‘x is not-’, it is not at all clear in what sense the predicate ‘is not-’ 
represents a property that is a negative property – the negation of .” In 
particular, if properties simply are entities, then there is no explanation of what 
features of the property of being not  would make it logically incompatible with 
the property of being . 
 
At any rate, if one takes predicate conjunction as fundamental, then one 
certainly cannot derive the facts about conjunctive predication from the logical 
rules that govern sentential conjunction. One needs to add a new logical rule 
connecting conjunctive predications to sentential conjunctions. In this sense, one 
cannot extract an account of conjunctive, disjunctive, and negative predication 
from a disquotational semantic characterization of these operators plus one’s 
account of sentential conjunction, disjunction, and negation, respectively. 
 
There is a lacuna here that the proponent of such combinatory 
approaches could exploit. Thoroughgoing advocates of combinatory approaches 
such as Curry and Feys (1958/1968) might simply refrain from deploying 
sentential connectives, taking the operations of negation, conjunction, and 
disjunction to operate on a single type of object. Lewis (1983b)—following Frege 
(1879/1970: 3-4)—imagines that sentences consist in applying an unvoiced 
predicate to this sort of object. In other words, all sentences are predications. 
 
Fully exploring this strategy would take us into complicated territory. So I 
merely note two unwelcome features. The first is that a pure combinatory 
approach avoids the need to explain certain equivalences only by positing other 
equivalences in need of explanation. In order to reconstruct first-order logic, 
combinatory logic must supplement the predicate forming operators ‘not’, ‘and’, 
and ‘or’ with other combinators. In particular, to differentiate the monadic 
predicate x(Fx&Gx) from the dyadic predicate xy(Fx&Gy), the combinatorial 
approach typically appeals to a new operator, W, that takes a dyadic predicate 
and fills both argument positions.13 The introduction of such operators raises 
new logical connections. For instance, (WF)a is the result of applying W to a 
relation term F (or xy(Fxy)) and then applying the result to a term a. Thus, 
(WF)a must be logically equivalent to Faa. This is not a problem per se for the 
advocate of combinatory logic. But it does darken the prospects of doing so 
without providing a more worked out background theory of the objects 
designated by the “combinated” predicates. 
 
The other unwelcome feature of the combinatory approach is related to 
an objection from Hochberg (2003: §1g) discussed in §5 below. The general 
worry is that combinators destroy type distinctions. The operators will need to 
be able to apply to predicates of any adicity. One might be concerned that this 
makes it more difficult to resist the paradoxes. But a more direct concern is that 
predicates are identified partially by contrasting them with other types of 
expression. If the operators may take purportedly 0-adic, monadic, and dyadic 
                                                        
13 The notation ‘W’ is taken from Curry and Feys (1958/1968: 152). 
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expressions indiscriminately, then it is less plausible that any of the expressions 
of the language are actually predicates.  
 
4.2 Primitive Abstraction  
 
Those who appeal to primitive -abstraction need not posit two notions 
of negation, conjunction, and so on. Sentential operations and -abstraction 
suffice. But still, conjunctions such as (1) ‘Joe is young and Joe is a kangaroo’ are 
different, at least syntactically, from corresponding ascriptions of conjunctive 
properties as in (1*) ‘Joe is young and is a kangaroo’. Similarly, a statement that 
an object stands in a relation to itself as in (3) ‘Joe saw Joe’ [or: ‘S(Joe,Joe)’] 
differs from an equivalent statement ascribing the corresponding reflexive 
property to that object as in (3*) ‘Joe is such that he saw himself.’ [or: 
‘xS(x,x)(Joe)’]. This equivalence demands explanation. 
 
For now, suppose that the truth conditions of sentence (3) will be 
specified disquotationally: ‘S(Joe,Joe)’ is true iff Joe saw Joe. The truth conditions 
of sentence (3*) will be specified as follows: ‘xS(x,x)(Joe)’ is true iff 
xS(x,x)(Joe). From this semantic characterization, one cannot derive that (3) is 
true merely from the fact that (3*) is true without employing conversion. Thus, 
the equivalence of (3) and (3*) is not explained by their disquotational truth 
conditions alone. One must suppose that conversion is an additional logical law 
that blocks the demand for further explanation. 
 
Another version of this strategy derives from what Church  (1951, 1973) 
calls alternative (0) and is developed by contemporary proponents of 
“structured” propositions. On this approach, every sentence has a content. We 
may think of this as the proposition expressed by a sentence. I represent the 
relevant structured entity using brackets ‘{…}’. Thus, ‘{A,B}’ will designate the 
structured whole composed of the designate of ‘A’ and ‘B’. In the case of an 
atomic sentence such as (3), this content is determined by the meanings of ‘Joe’, 
‘saw’, and ‘Joe’, taken in that order.14 A proponent of structured propositions 
might say that the content of (3) is a structured proposition containing the 
relation of seeing, S, and two occurrences of the individual Joe, represented as: 
{S, Joe, Joe}.  
 
Complex sentences raise complications, but—as a concession to the 
advocate of complex properties—I will assume that they too have a single 
content. Thus, the content of a sentence of the form ‘&’ derives from the 
contents of ‘’ and of ‘’, and the content of ‘&’.  Specifically, I assume that it is 
the structured fact whose first component is the content of ‘’, whose second 
component is the content of ‘&’ represented as ‘^’, and whose third component is 
the content of ‘’. We may then represent the content of (1) as 
{{Y,Joe},^,{K,Joe}}.15 
                                                        
14 I am ignoring the many complications that arise concerning relational 
predication. 
15 Here I am following Soames’s (2003: 101-6) pseudo-Russellian account of 
propositions. Once again, I will ignore the many complications with taking logical 
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According to the proponent of primitive -conversion, the content of a 
complex predication such as (1*) and (3*) will be a simple predication, 
composed only of the property and the individual to which it is ascribed. Thus, 
the content of these sentences will be {x(Yx&Kx),Joe} and {xS(x,x),Joe}, 
respectively.16  
 
What is the connection between the proposition expressed by a sentence 
such as (1) or (3) and the proposition expressed by corresponding complex 
predication (1*) or (3*)? Salmon (2010, 448) offers an answer by contrasting the 
content of two sentences analogous to (3) and (3*).  
 
 These sentences therefore do not express the same proposition. The -
abstract in [(3*)] expresses a property or concept not expressed in [(3)]: 
that of [self-seeing]. Yet [(3*)] and [(3)] are logically equivalent, by the 
rules of -expansion (which licenses the inference from [(3*)] to [(3)]) 
and -contraction (which licenses the reverse inference).17 
 
So Salmon (210: 451) thinks that the propositions expressed by sentences that 
are -conversions of each other are distinct but logically equivalent. 
 
It is essential to my view that -converts like [(3*)] and [(3)] are logically 
equivalent but nonsynonymous.  
 
Thus, the logical connection between the content of a complex predication and 
the content of its conversion is secured merely by positing a logical equivalence.  
 
Kripke (2005: 1025, footnote 45) warns Salmon that the lack of an 
explanation for this logical equivalence might undermine arguments that Salmon 
himself would want to offer. The point isn’t that conversion is an invalid step in a 
derivation. Rather, it’s that the legitimacy doesn’t follow from the logical moves 
required to understand simple predications and sentential operation them. Nor 
does it follow from these taken together with our account of what complex 
predication does. Indeed, it must be assumed as an additional rule in order to 
make our account of complex predication work.  
 
Thinking of predicates as expressing properties adds to this perplexity. 
For why should standing in a relation to one’s self as is asserted to obtain in (3) 
‘S(Joe,Joe)’ entail that one has a different, “reflexive”, property as is asserted to 
obtain in (3*) ‘xS(x,x)(Joe)’? This question is especially difficult to answer when 
assuming “structured” accounts of content outlined above. The proposition 
expressed by (3*) is composed simply of the property expressed by ‘xS(x,x)’ 
and an individual, Joe. The internal structure of the predicate ‘xS(x,x)’ is not 
                                                                                                                                                              
constants to represent. I do so only as a concession to advocates of complex 
predication. 
16 This account essentially follows Soames (2003: 101-6), but I believe also 
underlies the view of Salmon (2010). 
17 The example has been changed for continuity. 
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reflected in the proposition expressed. As Russell (1905, 482) remarks in a 
related context, the connection is “merely linguistic” and “through the phrase”. 
What is wanted is a “logical relation” between the proposition expressed by a 
complex predication and the proposition expressed by its conversion. Without 
additional considerations, that relation has gone missing.18 
 
Hochberg (1987: 90) brings this out by contrasting the difference 
between an individual  standing in a relation to ,  standing in that relation to 
, and  standing in that relation to itself. 
 
It should then be obvious that to assert (1) that  has R to , (2) that  
does not have R to itself, and (3) that  does not have R to  must be 
understood as claiming that exactly what is asserted to obtain between  
and  is asserted not to obtain between a and itself and between  and .  
 
Hochberg’s view, as I understand it, is that the intimate connection between 
holding that R(,) and xR(x,x)() suggests that these state one and the same 
fact. Asserting that R(,) ascribes to the pair <,> exactly what asserting 
¬R(,) or ¬R(, itself) denies of the pair <,>. In §5 and §6, I turn to a 
Russellian and a Fregean attempt to secure this result. 
 
5. Complex Predicates as Propositional Functions 
 
Suppose that a sentence S(n) contains a proper name n but is free of -
abstracts. Suppose further that the sentence has a content: it expresses a 
proposition or states a fact.  It would be helpful if a sentence of the form 
xS(x)(n) expresses the very same proposition, or states the same fact. The goal 
is to secure against the objection that: 
 
It is […] absurd to take the fact that a has the property of standing in R to 
b to be distinct from the fact that a stands in R to b. (Hochberg 2003: 80) 
 
On this view, the -abstract expresses a propositional function, “abstracted” from 
a whole proposition. The proposition is a value of the function for a given 
argument. Thus, the content of Rab is identical to the content of xRxb(a). This 
                                                        
18 Salmon (2010: 465) allows that the -abstract in  (3*) ‘xS(x,x)(Joe)’ has a 
propositional function—in the sense described below—as its semantic value, “in 
some sense”, but he denies that (3*) expresses the proposition which is the value 
of this function when Joe is the argument. Thus, (3*) expresses the proposition 
{xS(x,x),Joe}, where xS(x,x) is a propositional function. The value of this 
function for argument Joe is the proposition {S, Joe, Joe}, which is different from 
{xS(x,x),Joe}. It would follow that the link between these two propositions is 
more than “purely verbal”. But not by much. For we have no explanation of why 
the result of predicating a propositional function of an individual is always 
equivalent to the proposition that is the value of the propositional function for 
that individual as an argument.  
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is meant to explain the equivalence between a complex predication and its 
conversion. 
 
But what is a propositional function? In his early work, Russell is a realist 
about propositional functions. After finding a number of reductions 
unsatisfactory, Russell (1903: §81) takes propositional functions to be 
“indefinable” structured wholes containing “the variable”. Replacing the variable 
by a corresponding individual in this complex results in a proposition. The 
propositional function denotes such propositions.19 
 
The immediate problem with such a view is that there is no “backward 
road” from a proposition to a propositional function that takes it as a value. That 
is, even assuming that ‘Joe sees Joe’ expresses a proposition, representable as 
{Joe, seeing, Joe}, it does not follow that there is a corresponding structured 
complex {x, seeing, x} that denotes it. The propositional function—so 
construed—is  something over and above than the proposition. 
 
Another problem is inferring the existence of the proposition from the 
propositional function. Russell suggests that there is a “logical connection” 
between the two, “in virtue of which such [propositional functions] inherently 
and logically denote such [propositions]”.20 But it is unclear what such a logical 
relation might be.21 For this reason, Russell (1903: §81; 1906) tries various 
strategies to do without propositional functions.  
 
It is worth noting that there are other realist accounts of propositional 
functions. For instance, Soames (2003: 102-106; 2008) offers a reconstruction of 
Russell’s logic, according to which propositional functions are simply ordinary 
functions from individuals into propositions.  
 
 Viewing complex predicates as denoting functions from individuals into 
propositions in this way presupposes a background theory of functions. So it’s 
hard to see how it could explain the logical relationship between a complex 
statement and a corresponding complex predication. 
 
More importantly, functions are best understood as single-valued 
relations. A relation R is a function just in case any object a is related by R to 
exactly one object b. In order to generate enough functions, one already needs an 
abundant supply of relations in the background.  So rather than explaining the 
distribution of abundant properties in terms of a sparse base, this conception of 
complex predicates simply assumes a background property theory. At least, it 
                                                        
19 See discussion in Hylton (2005b) and Klement (2003; §7). 
20 Russell (1903: §56) is talking about the relation of a denoting concept to its 
denotation, of which the relation of propositional functions to propositions 
seems to be a special case. Russell (1905: 486) also says that the relation 
between a denoting concept and its denotation must be “logical”. 
21 Obviously, these considerations relate to Russell’s infamously complicated 
Gray’s Elegy argument in “On Denoting”.  
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assumes a property theory generous enough to provide abundant single-valued 
relations between objects and propositions.22  
 
 Hochberg (2003: §1g) points out another problem with taking the 
properties specified by complex predicates to be functions in this way: it is 
questionable whether the strategy generalizes to relations. In particular, if one 
supposes that the complex predicate ‘x(Sxx)’ expresses a function from 
individuals to conjunctive propositions, then it is natural to suppose that 
‘xy(Sxy)’ is a relation term that expresses a function from an individual to a 
proposition. This function takes an individual a to yield the propositional 
function y(Say).  This new function takes an individual b to yield the proposition 
that Sab. This identification of relations with functions from individuals into new 
functions—known as Schönfinkelization—is a perfectly legitimate way to model 
relations. Yet as metaphysics, it seems implausible as it creates an asymmetry 
between properties (which take an individual into a proposition) and relations 
(which take an individual to yield a function). 
 
6. Complex Predicates as Fregean Functions 
 
 The task is to show that the truth of a complex predication such as ‘Joe is 
young and is a kangaroo’ is logically entailed by—or at least explained by—the 
truth of a corresponding complex sentence such as ‘Joe is young and Joe is a 
kangaroo’. The Fregean account of complex predicates purports to secure this 
result. For Frege, the result of removing some number of occurrences of a name 
from a sentence leaves an expression that takes the semantic value of the name 
as an argument.  
 
Suppose that a simple or complex symbol occurs in one or more places of 
an expression[…]If we imagine this symbol as replaceable by another (the 
same one each time) at one or more if its occurrences, then the part of the 
expression that shows itself invariant under such replacement is called 
the function; and the replaceable part, the argument of the function. 
(Frege 1879: 13) 
 
The sequence ‘…is young and…is a kangaroo’ results from removing ‘Joe’ from 
‘Joe is young and Joe is a kangaroo’. On Frege’s view, this sequence is a complex 
predicate, denoting a function mapping an individual to the true just in case that 
individual is both young and a kangaroo. Function terms that result from the 
removal of some occurrences of a name from a sentence are the complex 
predicates of Frege’s system. 
                                                        
22 Russell (1903: §482) himself argues that ordinary mathematical functions 
presuppose background propositional functions: “If f(x) is not a propositional 
function, its value for a given value of x […] is the term y satisfying the 
propositional function y=f(x), i.e. satisfying, for the given value of x, some 
relational proposition; this relational proposition is involved in the definition of 
f(x), and some such propositional function is required in the definition of any 
function which is not propositional.” 
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Frege (1893: §1) introduces the Greek letters ‘’ and ‘’ to mark the 
argument places. Thus, the monadic predicate ‘() is young and () is a kangaroo’, 
results from the removal of both occurrences of ‘Joe’ from (1), while the dyadic 
predicate ‘() is young and () is a kangaroo’ relates two individuals just in case 
one is young and the other is a kangaroo.  
 
This approach can account for the logicality of the inference from a 
complex predication to a corresponding complex or relational sentence because, 
at some level, they are the very same sentence. As Evans (1985c: 204) remarks, a 
statement attributing a complex predicate such as ‘() sees ()’ to Joe is the same 
as the statement attributing a relational predicate such as ‘() sees Joe’ to Joe. 
 
Consider for a moment the properties determined by the following two 
monadic predicate expressions: [‘() sees Joe’ and ‘() sees ()’]. These 
are certainly different properties, in that there are objects which satisfy 
the second but which do not satisfy the first. But it is not correct to infer 
from that in all cases, the ascription of one property yields a statement 
with a different content from that which results from the ascription of the 
other property to that individual. When the two properties are ascribed 
to [Joe], the results are the same, namely: [‘Joe sees Joe’].  
 
Similarly, a statement attributing the complex predicate ‘() is young and () is a 
kangaroo’ to Joe just is the complex sentence (1) ‘Joe is young and Joe is a 
kangaroo’. The sentences in each pair are logically equivalent, because they are 
the very same sentence. 
 
Another advantage is that one need not posit two types of conjunction, 
one between predicates and the other between sentences. As Dummett (1981, 
15) says,  
 
[I]t is of great importance that the predicate itself is not thought of as 
having been built up out of its component parts: we do not need to invoke 
the conception of the conjunction of two predicates, [‘() is young’] and 
[‘() is a kangaroo’] to explain the formation of the predicate [‘() is young 
and () is a kangaroo’].  
 
So unlike approaches appealing to primitive combinators, everything is handled 
through the sentential connective ‘and’ together with the abstraction operation. 
 
 At its heart, the strategy rests on the Fregean idea that a single “content” 
may be “carved” into different function and argument structures.  
 
The same conceptual content may be regarded as a function of this or that 
argument, so long as function and argument are completely determinate. 
(Frege 1879, 14) 
 
But, it also rests on the idea that a single sentence has many different function 
and argument structures. The sentence ‘Joe is young and Joe is a kangaroo’ is 
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both a conjunction and a predication. This cuts against the grain of modern 
syntactic theories according to which a sentence such as (1) ‘Joe is young and Joe 
is a kangaroo’ has a single compositional structure.  
 
I see two difficulties with this approach. One problem is that the very 
formulation of the approach requires one to be able to identify the constituents 
of a sentence. One must be able to see that ‘Joe’ is a constituent of ‘Joe is young 
and Joe is a kangaroo’. Yet, on the Fregean approach, it is difficult to see where 
these syntactic facts come from. For instance, (9) results from applying the 
quantifier ‘someone’ to the predicate ‘() is young and Joe is a kangaroo’.  
 
(9) Someone is young and Joe is a kangaroo. 
 
One should be able to form a predicate by removing ‘Joe’ from (9). But it is 
unclear what allows us to infer that ‘Joe’ is a constituent of (9). As Dummett 
would say, the complex predicate ‘() is young and Joe is a kangaroo’ is not “built 
up” from the constituent predicate ‘() is young’. So if ‘() is young’ is not a 
constituent, it is unclear why ‘Joe’ should be.23 
 
Another problem posed by Russell concerns the coordination of argument 
places in a Fregean function term. Specifically, Frege’s informal notation 
distinguishes the argument places of a function term using marks of 
incompleteness ‘’ and ‘’, but he is quite clear that these do not belong in his 
official notation (1893: §1). Nor does he give them any interpretation. They 
merely mark the gaps where a name has been removed.  
 
But, if Frege has no genuine notation to mark the gaps in a function term, 
then what requires that two gaps be filled by the same term? Russell (1903, 
§482) objects on precisely these grounds. 
 
Frege wishes to have the empty places where the argument is to be 
inserted indicated in some way; thus he says that in 2x3+x the function is 
2( )3 +( ). But here his requirement that the two empty places are to be 
filled by the same letter cannot be indicated: there is no way of 
distinguishing what we mean from the function involved in 2x3+y.  
 
As Russell is thinking, unless one offers some interpretation of the marks of 
incompleteness, the difference in marks of incompleteness does not correspond 
to anything. And so, we cannot distinguish a relational predicate such as ‘ sees ’ 
from a monadic predicate such as ‘ sees ’. 
 
7. Complex Predicates as Fragments of Sentential Contents 
 
 Russell (1903) considered a metaphysical version of the Fregean 
approach to complex predication, a variant of which has recently been defended 
by Armstrong (1997). Both Russell and Armstrong believe that some sentences 
have structured wholes as contents. Thus, Russell thought that sentences 
                                                        
23 See Pickel (2010) for a more sustained criticism. 
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expressed structured propositions, usually composed of the objects and 
properties that they are about. Armstrong holds that true atomic sentences and 
their conjunctions are made true by states of affairs, which are structured wholes 
composed of individuals and universals. 
 
 It might be tempting to think that complex predicates can be “carved out” 
of these structured wholes. Russell (1903: §§43, 44) considered the possibility 
that propositional functions could be replaced by “carvings” of these structured 
wholes that he called assertions. 
 
We may say, broadly, that every proposition may be divided, some in only 
one way, some in several ways, into a term (the subject) and something 
which is said about the subject, which something I shall call the assertion. 
Thus “Socrates is a man” may be divided into Socrates and is a man. 
(Russell 1903: §43)  
 
Suppose that {Joe, sees, Joe} is the structured whole expressed by ‘Joe sees Joe’. 
The idea then would be that a complex property such as seeing oneself, could be 
treated as the result of removing both occurrences of the individual Joe from the 
structured whole {Joe, sees, Joe}, leaving {( ), sees, ( )}. 
 
Armstrong’s (1997: 35-6) similar idea was to view a complex property as 
a state of affairs type. One may picture a complex property by picturing the state-
of-affairs, but leaving blanks where the objects should be. In this way, both 
Russell and Armstrong considered explaining some of their complex properties 
in terms of simpler ones. Such additional properties would be “no ontological 
addition” to the simple ones. 
 
Russell quickly rejects this analysis because it does not allow one to 
distinguish between a complex predicate attributed to a single subject and one 
that relates distinct subjects. Contrasting this approach with his own, which 
appeals to propositional functions containing “the variable”, Russell (1903: §44) 
says: 
 
An assertion was to be obtained from a proposition by simply omitting 
one of the terms occurring in the proposition. But when we omit [Joe], we 
obtain [{( ), sees, ( )}]. […] [I]t is essential that, in restoring the 
proposition, the same term should be substituted in the two places where 
dots indicate the necessity of a term. […] Of this requisite, however, no 
trace whatever appears in the would-be assertion, and no trace can 
appear, since all mention of the term to be inserted is necessarily omitted. 
When an x is inserted to stand for the variable, the identity of the term to 
be inserted is indicated by the repetition of the letter x; but in the 
assertional form no such method is available. 
 
Thus, Russell argued that propositional functions could not be reduced to 
assertions, or—in our terminology—complex predicates do not express 
fragments of propositions got at by knocking out individual constituents. 
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Hochberg (2001: 99) offers a related criticism of Armstrong, centered 
around Armstrong’s idea that universals must be instantiated.  
 
[W]hile Armstrong can hold that given two facts Fa and Gb, there is a 
conjunctive fact Fa&Gb […], he cannot hold that given the two universals F 
and G, there is a conjunctive universal (F&G)[…]. For he holds that all 
universals must be instantiated. 
 
Suppose that ‘Fa&Ga’, if true, expresses {{F, a}, , {G, a}}. Armstrong would like to 
be able to abstract the property of being F and G from this fact and to represent it 
by leaving blanks for both occurrences of ‘a’: {F, (  ), , G (  )}. The problem is that  
‘Fa&Gb’ might express a fact representable as {{F, a}, , {G, b}}. Removing 
occurrences of both ‘a’ and ‘b’ would seemingly yield the same representation: 
{F, (  ), , G (  )}. But Armstrong would not want to infer the existence of a 
complex property being F and G from the existence of something that is F and 
something else that is G. For there might be nothing that has both F and G, in 
which case the property of being F and G would be an uninstatiated universal, 
which Armstrong seeks to avoid. For this reason, Armstrong himself (1997: 37) 
concedes that there is something “more” to a complex property than the state of 
affairs, but he does not explain what this is. 
  
8. Complex Predicates as Incomplete Symbols 
 
 We have seen that there are grave difficulties in securing a logical 
connection between a complex predication—construed as ascribing a property 
to an individual—and a corresponding complex statement. The natural solution 
is to find some way to do without complex properties in our austere schema, our 
preferred theory of the world.  
 
The applications of complex properties will then have to be dealt by other 
means. For instance, the treatment of the quantifiers in our preferred schema 
may ultimately have to do without them attaching to complex predicates, but 
directly to open sentences as in Tarski (1936).  If we wish to allow for 
intensional contexts that do not permit the substitution of identicals, then we 
will have to be more careful in formulating our rules for substitution.  
 
Finally, as Kim seemingly concedes, inter-theoretic reductions will need 
to be grounded by something other than identity. 
 
Say, there are three […] first-order properties, P1, P2 and P3. For 
something to have M, then, is for it to have P1 or have P2 or have P3. Here 
there is a disjunctive proposition or fact that the object has one or another 
of the three first-order properties; that is exactly what the fact that it has 
M amounts to. There is no need here to think of M itself as a property in 
its own right – not even a disjunctive property with the Ps as disjuncts.” 
(Kim 2000, 103-4)  
 
The idea seems to be that certain predications such as ‘Joe is a joey’ may be 
reduced to complex statements such as ‘Joe is young and Joe is a kangaroo’ 
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without that reduction proceeding by way of property identification, but by 
holophrastic paraphrase, truth-making, grounding or some other reductive 
device. 
 
 What of complex predicates as they occur in ordinary language? A 
revisionist might find reason to simply jettison them. Those who want to 
preserve the truth of such complex predications, however, might take refuge in a 
strategy of treating them as incomplete symbols, expressions which contribute 
to the truth conditions of sentences that contain them but which don’t 
correspond to any element of the reality represented by these statements. This 
seems to be the proposal sketched by Hochberg (1978: 255). 
 
Complex predicates do not stand for entities in this sense. Rather, 
complex predicates are meaningful signs of the system in that they are 
formed, according to general syntactic rules, from primitive predicates 
which are so interpreted. One may then suggest that we speak of complex 
properties as a result of our linguistic apparatus having certain features 
[…] By contrast , primitive predicates require properties in order for such 
predicates to be legitimate signs of  the schema.  
 
Construing complex predicates in this way carries significant explanatory 
burdens. In particular, we must specify exactly how the attribution of a complex 
predicate depends on the distribution of properties expressed by simpler 
predicates. 
 
But regardless of the ultimate assessment of complex predicates, they 
cannot be construed as expressing properties without some cost. Either, that 
cost is paid by positing a primitive new logical connection between a complex 
predication and its conversion. Or, that cost is to be paid by an additional non-
logical connection. Thus, complex predications do not in themselves legitimize 
abundant theories of properties. 
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